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Abstract
In two experiments, I investigated whether providing accuracy feedback on recognition
memory tests affects discriminability of encoded targets from lures. The primary hypothesis was
that feedback is a source of criterion noise which leads to lower discriminability. Additionally, it
was predicted that separate sources of criterion noise might have additive effects. In both
experiments, the presence of feedback was manipulated within-subjects. In Experiment 1,
participants completed two recognition tests in which they made either “old/new” decisions or
responded using an 8-point confidence scale. Feedback lowered discriminability for both
response type conditions, although a slightly larger deleterious effect was observed in the
“old/new” response condition. Whether people responded either with “old/new” decisions
versus on an 8-point confidence scale had no effect on discriminability. In Experiment 2, I
manipulated the strength of study items whereby half of the items were studied once (weak) and
the other half were studied four times (strong). At test, these targets were intermixed with an
equal number of lures. Additionally, the presence of color cues indicating the expected strength
of test items was varied between-subjects. Feedback decreased discriminability, although this
was primarily for the strong items. The presence of color cues marking expected strength had no
effect on discriminability. Taken together, these results suggest that feedback has a deleterious
effect on recognition discriminability and that this may result via feedback introducing criterion
noise into the recognition decision.
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Introduction
Null effects of corrective test feedback on discriminability of studied from nonstudied
items dominate the recognition memory literature. Feedback is generally unhelpful to
discriminability when using continuous recognition (Estes & Maddox, 1995), under
manipulations of base rates (Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007; Kantner & Lindsay, 2010; Selmeczy &
Dobbins, 2013), memory strength (Verde & Rotello, 2007; Hicks & Starns, 2014), with older
adults (Jennings & Jacoby, 2003), or with exotic stimuli such as complex melodies or paintings
(Lindsay & Kantner, 2011). These results are somewhat surprising given that we might expect
feedback to improve discriminability in several possible ways, such as allowing people to adapt a
more optimal response criterion (Kantner & Lindsay, 2010) or by enhancing metacognitive
monitoring of test stimuli (Selmeczy & Dobbins, 2013). Some formal models of signal detection
theory (SDT) rely explicitly on the integration of feedback and stimulus representations for
making recognition decisions. For example, Turner, Van Zandt, and Brown (2011) proposed that
when feedback is present, it can help improve recognition performance by allowing people to
update their information regarding both signal and noise distributions.
Although most researchers that have investigated the effects of feedback on recognition
memory have typically noted no difference in discriminability for participants in control or
feedback conditions, few, if any, have considered feedback to be a source of harm on recognition
judgments. For example, Kantner and Lindsay (2010) conducted four experiments expecting a
positive feedback effect but instead found three null effects and a significant negative effect of
feedback in Experiment 2. They also noted that in all their experiments, discriminability was
numerically lower in the feedback conditions. Kantner and Lindsay (2010) dismissed the
possibility that their lack of positive effects was due to a Type II error in their study because
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there was no trend for feedback to improve discriminability. Selmeczy and Dobbins (2013) also
dismissed the possibility of a Type II error, noting that their pattern of results did not display a
trend toward feedback improving recognition sensitivity. However, neither study entertained the
possibility that with sufficient statistical power, feedback may actually have a negative effect on
performance.
One plausible explanation is that introducing feedback may harm recognition via
criterion noise. According to Benjamin, Diaz, and Wee’s (2009) noisy decision theory of signal
detection (ND-TSD), criterion noise is introduced into recognition decisions via two
mechanisms: the maintenance and updating of decision criteria. Both of these processes place an
encumbrance on memory, which can subsequently lead to poorer recognition performance
(Benjamin et al., 2009). Incorporating feedback into recognition decisions can easily be thought
of as a way to promote appropriate updating and placement of response criteria. In fact, using
feedback to better control criterion placement, rather than to influence discriminability, is often
the primary reason that feedback is applied (e.g., Verde & Rotello, 2007). Thus, the primary goal
of this study is to assess whether or not corrective feedback at test can introduce criterion noise
leading to a decrement in memory discriminability. In the next few sections I first discuss a
signal detection framework for recognition memory decisions. Next, I present evidence that
feedback appears to be detrimental to recognition discriminability. Finally, I discuss how
feedback may be viewed as causing criterion noise (or criterion variance).
Signal Detection Theory
Signal detection theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005), has
provided a successful framework in which to understand recognition memory. Consider a typical
laboratory recognition study in which people study a list of words and take a test that contains a
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mixture of studied and non-studied words. According to SDT, these two types of test items can
be represented as separate distributions that vary on the singular dimension of familiarity or
memory strength. Studied items comprise the target (signal + noise) distribution and sit farther to
the right of the lure distribution (noise only). This is depicted below in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Theoretical target and lure distributions plotted on an axis of memory strength with
stronger items in memory farther to the right. The vertical line labeled “C” represents an optimal
criterion.

Because memory is not perfectly veridical and people come into the laboratory with some
pre-existing level of familiarity with all test items (at least when they are known words), these
distributions overlap to some degree. This overlap requires that people set a criterion on this axis
of memory strength, which is essentially a threshold by which test items are judged. This
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criterion is often assumed to be fixed throughout the entire test (e.g., Stretch & Wixted, 1998).
Importantly, most applications of SDT to recognition memory assume that unlike noise imparted
by the test stimuli, there is no decision noise introduced by the criterion itself. That is, criterion
variance equals zero (Green & Swets, 1966). If a test item exceeds this criterion it will be called
“old” otherwise it will be called “new.” Items correctly called “old” are denoted as hits and those
incorrectly called “old” are false alarms, the proportions of which can be used to calculate an
overall hit rate (HR) and false alarm rate (FAR). These measures can be used to further define
recognition performance by calculating a measure of discriminability (d’) which indexes the
distance between the peaks of the signal and noise distributions in standardized units.
Additionally, various measures of response bias and/or criterion placement can be calculated
which represents either a person’s overall tendency to call test items “old” or to estimate the
point along the familiarity axis at which a criterion sits. The ideal observer will set a criterion
that maximizes the HR and minimizes the FAR.
How Does Feedback Affect Recognition Discriminability?
The vast majority of studies have found either a null or negative effect of feedback on
recognition memory discriminability. Some of the earliest research suggesting a feedbackinduced improvement came from Titus (1973) who had participants study CVC trigrams and
take a recognition test in which he manipulated the presence of feedback at test as well as
participants’ awareness of the base-rates of test items. For all subjects, only 20% of test items
were old. This proportion of test items requires that people set a very conservative criterion in
order to be most optimal. Titus analyzed HRs and FARs across the 75-item test in 3 blocks and
found that when people were unaware of the base-rates of test items but received feedback, a
conservative shift in criterion was observed as participants’ HRs and FARs decreased across
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blocks, although the decrease in the FAR was most apparent. Statistically, neither prior
knowledge of the probability that a test item was studied nor feedback affected recognition
discriminability. However, d’ values I estimated from the reported HRs and FARs (based on an
equal variance assumption) suggest that feedback helped improve performance overall, most
notably when subjects had no knowledge about the probability of target items being old (i.e., an
improvement from 1.61 to 1.97). This is what would be expected when criterion placement is
nonoptimal in the control condition. The results also suggested an improvement in d’ when
subjects were informed about the target probability, as performance increased from 1.61 in the
control condition to 1.84 with the additional instruction.
An early study by Clark and Greenberg (1971) suggests that the presence of feedback (or
knowledge of results) harms recognition memory. Following the learning of 18 CVC trigrams,
participants took 3 successive blocks old/new recognition tests. In each block, the same 18
trigrams were the targets and a unique set of 12 trigrams was used as lures. Averaged over the
blocks, d’ was 1.30 for the no-feedback group and 1.02 for the feedback group. It should be
noted that this main effect was obtained in the context of interactions with other variables,
including performance across blocks (1 through 3) and another factor of induced anxiety during
the test procedure.
This line of research perplexingly remained at a standstill over 20 years until Estes and
Maddox (1995) studied the effects of feedback using a modified continuous recognition
paradigm. In their paradigm, a set of stimuli was studied initially and people were instructed to
call each item on this list “new.” After this phase, stimuli were continuously introduced in a
hybrid learning/testing procedure. Each item was presented for an “old/new” decision in
different testing blocks. Within each block, three types of items occurred: brand new items, items
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from the initial study list, and items repeated from the prior block. Items from the study list and
those repeated from prior blocks are considered targets. Brand new items in each block are
considered lures. This stands in contrast to the more common procedure in which people study a
set of items in a learning phase that is entirely distinct from the testing phase. They manipulated
stimulus type between-subjects such that participants studied random digits, letter trigrams, or
words. Feedback was also manipulated across participants along with the base-rates of test items
whereby either 67% or 33% of the test items were old. Participants were unaware of the baserate manipulation. Across two experiments, marginally significant positive feedback effects were
found for digit and letter stimuli. For the word stimuli, the presence of feedback again exerted no
effect of discriminability, though there was a numerical benefit for those receiving feedback,
particularly in Experiment 2. Regarding response bias, participants appropriately adopted either a
liberal or conservative “old”-saying bias for the 67% and 33% old conditions when feedback was
present, although feedback did not significantly impact subjects’ criterion for words (Estes &
Maddox, 1995). As with the Titus (1973) study, feedback influenced criterion-setting in this
study by getting people to shift to a criterion placement more consistent with the base rates of the
target and lure items and seemed to nominally improve discriminability. However, the results of
this study should interpreted cautiously for two reasons. First, few subjects were tested in each
condition, which limits both statistical power and generalizability. Second, the use of the hybrid
continuous recognition paradigm makes it unclear whether feedback is impacting processes at
encoding or retrieval.
Rhodes and Jacoby (2007) included feedback with recognition tests in order to assess
whether participants could dynamically shift their criterion when different base-rates of old items
covaried with a particular study location. In Experiment 3, participants completed 4 study-test
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blocks in which they received feedback in either the first two test blocks or the last two. They
found that the presence of feedback and awareness of the base-rate manipulations were necessary
for participants to appropriately shift their decision criteria. They also found that when feedback
was given for the first two test blocks, discriminability was best in the first block and
subsequently dropped off for the other three blocks. For participants who received feedback on
the last two test blocks, discriminability was consistent across on blocks 1 and 2 and declined
when they received feedback for blocks 3 and 4. It is difficult to ascertain the overall influence of
feedback across these conditions, because explicit d’ values were not presented separately for
each block within each condition, but feedback was associated with criterion shifting.
Likewise, Verde and Rotello (2007) also found that the presence of feedback was needed
in order for participants to optimally shift their criterion for test items that varied in memory
strength. Although they did not manipulate feedback within a particular experiment, their
findings across two experiments are noteworthy. In both Experiments 2 & 5, participants studied
a list of words in which some were studied once (weak condition) and some words were studied
four times (strong condition) and took a recognition test comprised of targets and lures from each
item class of items. No participants received feedback in Experiment 2 and all participants in
Experiment 5 received trial-by-trial accuracy feedback. Otherwise the procedures in these
experiments were identical. Although a criterion shift was observed only in the presence of
feedback (Exp. 5), discriminability was numerically better for both strong and weak items when
feedback was absent (Verde & Rotello, 2007). This study is somewhat unusual in that the strong
and weak items were tested in a particular sequence, with 40 strong items and 40 lures in the first
test block and the 40 weak items and lures in the last test block. Feedback in Experiment 5
prompted people to decrease the HR first (strong) testing block relative to Experiment 2, leaving
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the FAR relatively unaffected. In addition, feedback increased both the HR and FAR in the
second (weak) testing block, leaving discriminability only slightly lowered in the feedback
experiment. Of course, one drawback is that feedback is being compared across experiments,
rather than being manipulated within a single experiment.
Feedback was also examined in a study by Han and Dobbins (2008) who were interested
in whether people could shift their criterion without manipulations of memory strength or baserates of test items and without participants’ awareness of test manipulations. In Experiment 1,
participants completed 4 study-test cycles as in Rhodes & Jacoby (2007) and corrective feedback
was given in 2 of the 4 blocks. However, unlike Rhodes and Jacoby (2007) discriminability was
the same for feedback and no-feedback blocks. Experiments 2 & 3 introduced two types of false
positive feedback in order to see if participants would adjust their criterion in response to the
feedback. Indeed, participants were able to use the feedback to shift their criterion without
changes in discriminability. However, both of these latter experiments lacked a no-feedback
group so the impact of the different types of feedback on discriminability could not be assessed.
This limitation was addressed in a follow-up study in which two study-test blocks that
included different false feedback manipulations preceded two additional blocks in which no
feedback was given (Han & Dobbins, 2009). Again, the authors were primarily interested in
participants’ ability to incorporate feedback in order to shift their decision criterion. Criterion
shifts were readily observed in both experiments while discriminability was either unaffected by
presence of feedback (Exp. 1) or declined across blocks (Exp. 2; Han & Dobbins, 2009). This
finding echoes that of Rhodes and Jacoby (2007) who found that when feedback was present in
the first two study-test blocks, discriminability was best in the first block and declined
afterwards. One potential limitation of this study is that Han and Dobbins (2009) did not
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counterbalance the order in which participants received feedback, as blocks with feedback
always came before no-feedback blocks.
Some of the most comprehensive work recently that has examined how feedback affects
recognition memory is that of Kantner and Lindsay (2010). They were interested in whether
feedback could enhance discriminability when participants completed a single study phase
followed by a single test. They manipulated feedback between-subjects and across four
appreciably distinct experiments found null feedback effects in three of them. However, in
Experiment 2 in which they also manipulated the base rates of test items, feedback significantly
lowered discriminability.
These null effects led the authors in a later study to consider whether the stimuli used in a
recognition paradigm would affect whether or not feedback was helpful. Specifically, in a
multitude of experiments, Lindsay and Kantner (2011) examined if feedback could enhance
recognition for complex stimuli such as Korean melodies, famous paintings, and verses of
poetry. For Korean melodies, two experiments yielded a small but significant positive effect of
feedback. In contrast, two conceptual replications of these experiments again using Korean
melodies produced null effects of feedback. In one replication, the authors manipulated both
feedback and recognition responses whereby participants make either “yes/no” decisions or
respond on a 6-point confidence scale. Discriminability was numerically lower in the feedback
condition, indicating no benefit from feedback. For the experiments using either famous
paintings or poetry, all of them with the exception of one of the poetry studies again resulted in a
null effect of feedback. These results were found in concert with a variety of other manipulations
such as participants’ motivation, test format (yes/no or rating scale response), orientation tasks,
and study list presentation (human or robot voices). Appropriately, the authors warn caution
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when considering the small positive effects found in this study as 13 of the 16 experiments
resulted in null effects.
Another recent examination of feedback in recognition memory was by Hicks & Starns
(2014) who were interested in delineating the circumstances under which within-list strengthbased criterion shifts could be facilitated by manipulating test composition. Similarly to Verde
and Rotello (2007), memory strength was manipulated via study repetitions whereby weak items
were studied only once and strong items studied four times. Tests were comprised of 80 items
that had an equal number of strong targets and lures as well as an equal number of weak targets
and lures. In some conditions, the lures were designated as strong and weak only by a color cue,
setting up the expectation that participants would treat them differently based on their expected
strength (i.e., in being compared with either strong or weak target items in the same color). In
each of their first two experiments, they manipulated the presence vs. absence of this color cue
marking, with the prediction that color marking should enable criterion shifting between strong
and weak test blocks, whereas the lack of such marking would not. Test items were presented in
strong and weak blocks, the length of which was varied between-subjects. Additionally,
feedback was not given in Experiment 1, but all participants in Experiment 2 received corrective
feedback. Results indicated that both the presence of color cues and the presence of feedback
independently harmed discriminability (Hicks & Starns, 2014).
Selmeczy and Dobbins (2013) explored the interplay between metacognitive monitoring
and feedback using cues about the probability of a given test item being old or new. The
probability cues consisted of indications prior to each test item about its likelihood of being old,
with either a “likely old” or “likely new” statement. Some trials were preceded by these cues and
other trials were not. In their first experiment, these cues were correct 75% of the time. Feedback
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was manipulated between subjects. Selmeczy and Dobbins predicted that optimal criterion shifts
and better discriminability would result for cued versus uncued trials and that feedback would
help people adopt appropriate criteria. In both experiments, participants made “old/new”
decisions followed by a confidence judgment. These confidence judgments were later correlated
with recognition accuracy to produce a measure of metacognitive monitoring. Overall,
discriminability was better in cued trials but feedback did not improve discriminability across the
board nor did it selectively help only the cued trials. Although they only presented analyses that
are collapsed across feedback groups, as feedback did not yield a significant effect, the authors
mentioned two findings of importance. First, numerically the feedback had a negative effect.
Second, the worst discriminability was observed on cued trials when feedback was present
(Selmeczy & Dobbins, 2013). In Experiment 2, they manipulated cue validity in which test items
were preceded by a screen that correctly indicated the cues given were correct either 65% or 85%
of the time. Again, they replicated their results from Experiment 1 such that feedback did not
improve performance selectively or overall and that discriminability was best for cued trials.
Interestingly, in both experiments the metacognitive monitoring scores were lower for those in
feedback conditions (Selmeczy & Dobbins, 2013). This suggests that feedback might introduce
some uncertainty into the recognition decision that is not present for those who receive no
feedback.
Null Effects or Type II Errors?
Much of the foregoing analysis is summarized below in Table 1 as a listing of feedbackrelated effect sizes from prior work.
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Table 1. Negative effects of feedback on recognition discriminability.

Study

Experiment

Sample Size

Cohen’s d

Kantner & Lindsay (2010)

Exp. 1
Exp. 2
Exp. 3
Exp. 4
All 16
Exp. 1
Exps. 2 & 5
Exp. 1
Exps. 1 & 2

46
71
43
77
538
30
53
16
596

.40
.58
.27
.28
.03
.17
.35
.00
.26

Lindsay & Kantner (2011)
Clark & Greenberg (1971)
Verde & Rotello (2007)
Han & Dobbins (2008)
Hicks & Starns (2014)

In this table, I included only those estimates in which effect size was reported or could be
reasonably estimated. Titus (1973) did not include d’ values or estimates of variability for them
Estes and Maddox (1995) did not report any measures of variability for their reported d’ values,
and only reported that F values were less than one in their ANOVA models examining the
influence of stimulus type and feedback on d’. Hence the effect size for these experiments could
not be reasonably estimated. It is important to note these absences from Table 1, because they
also represent the only cases in which at least nominal positive feedback effects have been
reported. Additionally, the Rhodes and Jacoby (2007) study did not report feedback vs. nofeedback conditions in enough detail to reasonably estimate an effect size. The descriptions of
their analyses imply that feedback either had a true null effect or perhaps a slight negative one.
The remaining entries in Table 1 suggest an overall trend for negative influences of feedback
when there are any above-zero effect sizes. Only the no-stress condition from the Clark and
Greenberg (1971) study was included in this table, because it is most comparable to the other
listed studies and to the experiments reported later.
Although most of the findings regarding feedback were not statistically significant as
reported in their respective publications, the range of effect sizes in Table 1 is considerable, with
12

some studies finding a true null effect size (Han & Dobbins, 2008) up to a medium-to-large
effect size showing a decline in discriminability (Cohen’s d = .53) in Kantner & Lindsay’s
(2010) study. Using G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), Figure 2 displays the
sample sizes needed to produce a significant negative influence of feedback for various levels of
statistical power for a within-subjects manipulation assuming the following parameters:
population effect size of Cohen’s d = .30, an estimated population correlation between repeated
measures of ρ = .503 derived from pilot data, and a Type I error rate of .05.

Figure 2. Sample size requirements for a given level of a prior statistical power to detect an
influence of feedback using a within-subjects design assuming a population effect size of
Cohen’s d = .30 and a population correlation between repeated measures of ρ = .503. Type I
error rate equals .05.

When power is set at .80 (i.e., 80%), a within-subjects manipulation of feedback would
require a total sample size of 90 participants, whereas a between-subjects manipulation of
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feedback would require 352 participants. Note that the Hicks and Starns (2014) between-subjects
comparison of feedback versus no feedback involved over 500 subjects. Although significant
results with large effect sizes have been found with smaller samples (e.g., Kantner & Lindsay,
2010), this illustrates the point that although noteworthy effects of feedback might exist, they can
be difficult to detect as significant depending on the experimental design and manipulations
used.
Noisy Decision Theory of Signal Detection
The overall results from Table 1 suggest very small effect sizes associated with positive
influences of feedback, but small-to-moderate effects sizes in the negative direction. On average,
the data suggest that feedback is likely more harmful than helpful. Given the assumption that
feedback might be doing some harm, one must consider a theoretical basis for it. One candidate
process is increased criterion variability caused by feedback. The noisy decision theory of signal
detection (ND-TSD; Benjamin et al., 2009) is a recent example highlighting the possibility that
criterion noise can disrupt recognition memory processes. This instantiation of SDT primarily
contrasts with the classic SDT as outlined above in its assumptions regarding response criterion.
As mentioned earlier, classic STD (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005)
assumes that criterion variance is non-existent or negligible. In contrast, ND-TSD postulates that
the response criterion is a random variable allowed to vary from trial to trial (Benjamin et al.,
2009). As a consequence, criterion noise can be introduced into recognition decisions. Criterion
noise is essentially a memory burden that can result from simply trying to maintain a response
criterion or by attempting to update a criterion. Regarding the maintenance of response criterion,
the authors posit that the use of a criterion to make recognition decisions requires that a person
remember what that criterion value is from trial to trial. In a basic recognition paradigm where

14

people study a single list of words and make simple “old/new” decisions, only a single criterion
is needed for the entire test and participants must remember to apply that standard of evidence to
every test item. In contrast, consider the case in which at test participants make recognition
decisions using a 6 point confidence scale. In order to make recognition decisions in this context,
participants must establish and use five different criterion values, one for each confidence
boundary. Because of the additional memory resources needed to maintain and switch between
multiple criterion values, discriminability performance could be worse in this situation. Thus,
ND-TSD predicts that having to use and remember multiple criterion values creates criterion
noise subsequently leading to worse recognition performance (Benjamin et al., 2009).
Benjamin et al. (2009) aimed to demonstrate that criterion noise contributed significantly
to recognition decisions by having participants complete an ensemble recognition task and then
modeling individuals’ response frequencies to evaluate whether their data better fit statistical
models of discriminability that assume either zero (SDT) or non-zero (ND-TSD) criterion
variability. In their experiment, participants studied a list of words and took an ensemble
recognition test in which set size was manipulated. On each test trial, participants were presented
with one, two, or four items together and asked to make a recognition decision on the entire set
of items. The items in each ensemble were either all old or all new items. This manipulation of
set size was intended to allow the authors to separately estimate the unique contribution of
stimulus and decision noise, where stimulus noise is the uncertainty introduced by the test items
themselves and decision noise reflects criterion variability. Benjamin et al. reasoned that set size
should affect stimulus noise but not criterion noise because each ensemble is supposed to be
evaluated with a single criterion. The results of their model fitting favored ND-TSD over
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traditional SDT theory, which led the authors to suggest that criterion noise plays a large,
meaningful role in recognition decisions (Benjamin et al., 2009).
Benjamin, Tullis, and Lee (2013) have recently provided further evidence in support of
ND-TSD. In this study, they evaluate the claim of ND-TSD that maintaining a criterion
introduces noise by manipulating test format. After studying a list of words, participants took a
recognition test in which they made simple “old/new” decisions, or responded on a 4-point or 8point confidence scale. Because making recognition decisions using confidence scale ratings
requires a participant to maintain multiple confidence criteria, updating these multiple criteria
should produce more criterion noise. Thus, ND-TSD predicts that discriminability should be
worse when confidence ratings are used. In line with their predictions, Benjamin et al. (2013)
found that recognition discriminability was best when participants made “old/new” judgments
and dropped significantly as more decision points were added.
With regard to the adjustment or updating of a criterion relevant to the present focus on
feedback, manipulations attempting to get participants to change their criterion also introduce
noise into the recognition decision (Benjamin et al., 2009). Again, this is because doing so places
a non-trivial memory load on the recognizer. Consider the case where participants make
“old/new” decisions and accuracy feedback is either present or absent. When feedback is not
given, participants have no basis for updating their criterion and subsequently only have to
remember a single criterion value that may not change much throughout the test. Conversely,
when feedback is present, it serves as an external recommendation by which participants attempt
to adjust their criterion. When a participant responds “old” and is given feedback that her
decision was wrong, she may adjust the criterion for the next few test items to be slightly more
conservative. Similarly, when she responds “new” incorrectly, she may adopt a slightly more
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liberal response criterion. This constant adjustment of a criterion across a test is not only
cognitively demanding (Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007), but also requires that a participant remember
the updated criterion value and then use it accordingly. Thus, over the course of a memory test, a
no-feedback condition only requires participants to remember a singular criterion value, whereas
a feedback condition prompts participants to adjust and remember new criterion values multiple
times throughout the course of a test. It may be crucial whether the adjustment of a criterion is
systematic and helpful, versus random and unhelpful. For example, when feedback is applied to
encourage people to adjust from a nonoptimal criterion placement to a more optimal one,
feedback should likely help performance. Indications of this type of help can be seen in the work
by Titus (1973) and Estes and Maddox (1995), although Kantner and Lindsay’s (2010) second
experiment also used extreme base rates and found a negative influence of feedback. But when
people may already be optimal in their spontaneous criterion placement, feedback may cause
them to adjust in nonoptimal ways, creating noise. The results in other experiments by Kantner
and Lindsay (2010) and by Hicks and Starns (2014) are consistent with this possibility.
Although recent evidence has supported ND-TSD (Benjamin et al., 2009, 2013), the
theory is not without its critics. Kellen, Klauer, and Singmann (2012) re-analyzed the data set
from Benjamin et al. (2009) and also provided new data from a recognition test in which they
manipulated their subjects’ responses by having them give either confidence ratings or ranking
judgments. On confidence rating test trials, participants saw a single test probe and were asked to
give it a confidence judgment using a 6 point rating scale. For ranking trials, participants were
shown four test items and, knowing that only one of them was old, asked to rank order each item
on its probability of being previously studied. This ranking task was supposed to be analogous to
a forced-choice alternative task whereby participants can make decisions based solely on
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memory strength without reference to any criterion and thus free of any criterion noise. Kellen et
al. (2012) argue that the results of their modeling of the recognition data indicate that ND-TSD
does not provide a substantive account of signal detection over and above classic SDT. For most
of their sample, criterion variability was estimated to be zero and the amount of variability for
the few who displayed any at all was negligible. Hence, the authors concluded that ND-TSD
does not provide a substantive account of recognition memory beyond that of traditional SDT.
These findings stand in stark contrast to Benjamin et al. (2009) who argued that the presence of
criterion noise has a substantial impact on recognition performance.
The Hicks and Starns (2014) work also represents another way in which ND-TSD’s
predictions have not borne out. In their work, the finding that color cues indicative of memory
strength actually lowered discriminability contradicts a particular claim of ND-TSD. According
to Benjamin et al. (2009), when test items vary on a particular dimension (e.g. memory strength),
criterion variability is greater when the observer samples test items that have a larger range on
that dimension. When the testing environment does not readily allow the observer to treat
distinct classes of test items differently (e.g. strong or weak items), they will sample across the
entire range of old items, thereby increasing the range for criterion variance as well. However,
when these classes of items are readily distinguished, as is the case with the color cue
manipulation, participants should be able to treat these strong and weak items differently and
thus separately estimate the range of memory strength for weak and strong items. Consequently,
rather than having large criterion variability across all test items, this separate estimation reduces
criterion variability (and hence criterion noise) because each class of items has its own amount of
criterion variability which is smaller than the variability that comes from treating all old items
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similarly. Thus, ND-TSD predicts that the color marking manipulation of Hicks and Starns
should actually reduce criterion variability leading to better discriminability.
Hicks and Starns (2014) reported the opposite result: color marking produced a
decrement to recognition discriminability. On the surface, this result suggests that the use of
color marking to adjust one’s criterion may still have created noise. In many other studies,
information regarding test cues indicating base rates (ex. Van Zandt, 2000; Aminoff et al., 2012)
or memory strength (ex. Verde & Rotello, 2007; Hicks & Starns, 2014) are given as instructions
before a testing phase and participants are required to use the cues on their own. That is, they
must keep particular information or rules in mind about what different cues represent, select the
appropriate rule for each test item, and then try to use the cue to make a memory decision.
Because of the extra cognitive effort required to use cues in these situations, criterion noise may
be more apparent. However, one must also acknowledge that the effect size associated with the
color marking decrement was small. In addition, Hicks and Starns’ manipulation of color
marking depended on people noting how the colors differentiated strong from weak items and
keeping that in mind throughout the test on their own. However, other studies have administered
test cues in a manner that reduces the cognitive load on participants. For example, Selmeczy &
Dobbins (2013) provided alerting cues for each test item individually right before its
presentation. Thus, when the testing environment is highly supportive, such as by giving cues
individually for each test item (ex. Selmeczy & Dobbins, 2013; Bruno, Higham, & Perfect,
2009), criterion noise may be dramatically reduced.
Another difficulty in offering criterion noise as a mechanism by which feedback harms
recognition is that the presence of criterion noise should have noticeable effects on recognition
performance whenever it is present. However, if criterion noise affects recognition to such a
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large degree, why do non-significant feedback effects run rampant in the literature? The most
likely reason is that the effects of criterion noise are slightly more moderate than Benjamin et al.
(2009) suggest and that the majority of experiments examining feedback in recognition have not
possessed sufficient statistical power to find significant effects. However, as reviewed earlier,
notable exceptions to this trend exist in which a significant negative effect of feedback was
found. Kantner and Lindsay (2010) found a medium-sized effect (Cohen, 1992), while Hicks and
Starns (2014) found a small effect. Regardless, criterion noise does represent a potential
mechanism for deleterious feedback effects. Moreover, there is a long-standing argumentation in
the signal detection literature suggesting that feedback may disrupt recognition processes via
added criterion variability (e.g., Clark & Greenberg, 1971; Schoeffler, 1965). Wickelgren (1968)
reiterated the importance of considering criteria as having variances that must be considered
when comparing different recognition test contexts (e.g., “old/new” recognition versus rating
scales).
Overview of Current Study
The goal of this study is to evaluate the idea that accuracy feedback on a recognition test
is a source of criterion noise. According to ND-TSD (Benjamin et al., 2009), criteria can vary
from trial to trial and criterion noise is created when criteria are maintained and updated (see also
Schoeffler, 1965). Traditional SDT (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005)
assumes that criterion variance is zero. Thus, these theories make competing predictions about
the effect of feedback on recognition discriminability. Specifically, ND-TSD predicts that
because the aim of feedback is to help participants update their response criterion to optimize
performance, an ironic consequence is that this constant adjustment of criterion in response to
the feedback actually hurts performance by introducing criterion noise. In contrast, traditional
SDT (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) would predict either a null effect of
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feedback on discriminability because participants are unable to appropriately adjust their
criterion or that feedback would provide a benefit to recognition performance by allowing
participants to more optimally set their criterion (assuming they may begin nonoptimally).
Additionally, the hypothesis that multiple sources of criterion noise can have additive,
detrimental effects on recognition discriminability is tested here. That is, I assessed whether
criterion noise can be created with other test manipulations (e.g., rating scales, color cues) and
whether feedback would further decrease performance beyond these manipulations.
Additionally, I collected RT data in both experiments to examine whether a negative impact of
feedback on discriminability might be attributed to a speed-accuracy tradeoff.
In Experiment 1, participants completed a recognition test in which both feedback and the
length of the rating scale used to make a memory judgment (2 or 8 point) was manipulated. A
predicted source of criterion noise in recognition is the length of rating scales used to make
memory decisions (see also Wickelgren, 1968). Benjamin et al. (2013) found worse
discriminability for tests in which 8 point or 4 point confidence scales were used as compared to
simple “yes/no” responses. If maintaining multiple criteria creates criterion noise, then trying to
update and optimize multiple response criteria in response to accuracy feedback could create
additional criterion noise. RTs were predicted to be slower on the tests with feedback.
In Experiment 2, I manipulated the presence of feedback and color cues indicative of
memory strength similar to both Hicks and Starns (2014) and Verde and Rotello (2007).
However, both of these earlier studies manipulated feedback across experiments whereas here
feedback is varied within-subjects in the same experiment. Additionally, both of these studies
presented test items in varying sizes of strength blocks (strong or weak), whereas in this
experiment test items were randomly presented. Hicks and Starns (2014) do have one condition
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where test items were presented randomly, but feedback was not compared to a no-feedback
condition in this random test sequence. Here, both the feedback and color cues are crossed in a
factorial design with the hypothesis that presenting test items randomly rather than in blocks
would increase the likelihood of observing the effects of criterion noise because it would be
more difficult to maintain and update criteria on an essentially trial by trial basis rather than
when a block of a particular type of item is encountered. As mentioned earlier, ND-TSD predicts
that color cues should actually reduce criterion noise (Benjamin et al., 2009). However, based on
the work of Hicks and Starns (2014) and some pilot data, color cues were hypothesized to
decrease recognition performance. Reaction times were predicted to be slower in the presence of
both feedback and color cues.
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Experiment 1
Participants
One hundred and twenty-five undergraduate Psychology students from Louisiana State
University participated in this experiment to fulfill a partial course requirement or for extra
credit.
Materials
Five hundred and sixty unique words with the following characteristics were randomly
selected from the MRC psycholinguistic database
(http:www.psy.uwa.edu.au/mrcdatabase/uwa_mrc.htm): concreteness, familiarity, and
imageability ratings all between 200 and 600 on scales ranging from 100 to 700, Kučera-Francis
written frequency between 10 and 800, and word length between five and nine letters. Four sets
of 140 items were used to create study-test lists in four separate computer programs, all of which
were created using E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). These four
sets of items were equated for frequency, concreteness, and imageability. For each program, 70
words were randomly chosen to be studied and the remaining 70 words were used as new items
at test. This assignment of words to act either as studied targets or new lures at test was
counterbalanced. Both the presentation of studied and test items was randomized anew for each
participant.
Design
The design was a 2 (feedback: present or absent) × 2 (rating scale length: 2 or 8 point)
mixed factorial, with feedback manipulated within-subjects and rating scale length manipulated
between-subjects.
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Procedure
Participants were tested in groups of 1-3 people and completed two study-test cycles. For
the encoding phase, participants were instructed that they would study a list of words for a later
memory test. The studied words were presented individually for a duration of 2 seconds each
followed by a blank 250 ms ISI. Five primacy and recency buffers were included at the
beginning and end of each study list. Immediately following the study list, participants were
given instructions for the recognition test. Participants were told that they will be presented with
a mixture of studied and non-studied words.
Participants in the 2 point rating scale group were asked to make “old/new” decisions for
each test item by pressing the “/” key for “old” and the “z” key for “new” responses. For the
participants in the 8 point rating scale group, each test item appeared on the screen above an 8
point confidence rating scale ranging from 1 (“sure new”) to 8 (“sure old”). Participants were
asked to press the appropriate number key on the keyboard that corresponded to their level of
confidence and were encouraged to use the entire range of responses across the test.
On tests that included feedback, immediately following each response participants saw a
screen for 1 second informing them of the status of the word they just judged. If the word they
just made a response to was an old word, they saw the message “Studied!” appear in green. If the
word they made a response to was a new word, participants saw the message “Not Studied!” in
red. For the other recognition test that participants completed, no feedback was given. The order
in which participants received feedback (first or second test) was counterbalanced across
subjects.
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Results
The use of both a 2 and 8 point rating scale presents somewhat of an issue when trying to
compare recognition discriminability for these groups. The measure da can be calculated when
there is more than one point in z-ROC space, which is the case for the 8 point but not the 2 point
(yes/no) scale because there is no slope for a singular point in z-ROC space (Macmillan &
Creelman, 2005). Thus, da was calculated for both the feedback and no feedback conditions in
the 8 point scale group and the average slopes derived from these conditions were used to
calculate da for the 2 point conditions. That is, the slope calculated for the 8 point scale when
feedback was absent was used as a slope estimate for the 2 point condition in which there was
also no feedback. The same procedure was used to estimate a slope for the 2 point condition
when feedback was given from the 8 point rating scale in which feedback was also present.
Additionally, to ensure that the results were not specific to this particular metric of
discriminability, Az was also calculated for each participant. In the 8 point condition, da was used
to calculate Az and in the 2 point condition, d’ was substituted for da (Verde, Macmillan, &
Rotello, 2006).
Seven participants were excluded from the analyses because they were at or below
chance performance in one or both of the recognition tests. Thus, the final sample size for the
analyses was 118 participants.
Discriminability
Discriminability was analyzed by submitting the da measures to a 2 (feedback) × 2
(response type) × 2 (test order) mixed-factorial ANOVA. Table 2 displays the results below.
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Table 2. Group recognition data from Experiment 1 with standard error in parentheses.

2 Point Ratings

8 Point Ratings

No Feedback

Feedback

No Feedback

Feedback

HR

.71 (.02)

.71 (.01)

.72 (.02)

.72 (.01)

FAR

.26 (.02)

.37 (.02)

.28 (.02)

.31 (.02)

da

1.30 (.08)

.96 (.07)

1.26 (.08)

1.09 (.06)

Az

.81 (.01)

.73 (.01)

.79 (.01)

.77 (.01)

There was a main effect of feedback such that overall discriminability was lower in the
feedback condition, F(1, 116) = 29.60, MSE = .128, p < .001, ηp2 = .206. There was a trend for
feedback to interact with response type, although this was not significant, F(1, 116) = 3.31, p =
.072, ηp2 = .028. Pairwise comparisons showed that feedback had a somewhat larger negative
impact in the 2-point condition, t(57) = 4.94, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .64, than in the 8-point
condition, t(59) = 2.81, p = .007, Cohen’s d = .36. This result is depicted visually below in
Figure 3. There was no main effect of test order, F(1, 116) = 1.73, p = .19, or response type, F(1,
116) < 1, p = .61. Additionally, the interactions between feedback and test order, response type
and test order, as well as the three-way interaction were not significant, Fs < 1.
Az measures were also examined with a 2 (feedback) × 2 (response type) × 2 (test order)
mixed-factorial ANOVA. A significant main effect of feedback was found such that feedback
lowered discriminability, F(1, 116) = 32.34, MSE = .004, p < .001, ηp2 = .221. However, this
main effect was qualified by a significant feedback by response type interaction, F(1, 116) =
9.26, MSE = .004, p = .003, ηp2 = .075.
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da

No Feedback

Feedback

1.6
1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
2 point

8 point

Figure 3. Discriminability measure da in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 95% CIs as
recommended by Masson & Loftus (2003) for mixed-factorial designs.

Post-hoc tests showed that the negative effect of feedback was larger in the 2-point
condition, t(57) = 6.08, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .80, than in the 8-point condition, t(59) = 1.83, p =
.073, Cohen’s d = .24, and this result is shown below in Figure 4.

No Feedback

Feedback

1
0.9

Az

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
2 point

8 point

Figure 4. Discriminability measure Az in Experiment 1. Error bars represent 95% CIs as
recommended by Masson & Loftus (2003) for mixed-factorial designs.
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The main effects of test order, F(1, 116) = 1.34, p = .25, and response type, F(1, 116) =
.80, p = .37, were both not significant. Again there were no interactions between feedback and
test order, response type and test order, and the three-way interaction was not significant, Fs < 1.
Reaction Times
The group RT data is displayed on the following page in Table 3. Median RTs for hits
and correct rejections were also examined separately for the 2-point and 8-point conditions with
2 (feedback) × 2 (test order) mixed-factorial ANOVAs. Reaction times in the 2-point group were
initially trimmed if they were faster than 300ms or slower than 2000ms. For the 8-point group,
RTs faster than 500ms or slower than 4600ms were trimmed prior to analysis1.

Table 3. Average median RTs from Experiment 1 with standard error in parentheses.
2 Point
FB First
No FB
Hits

906.28
(48.60)

FB

8 Point
FB Second

No FB

FB

FB First
No FB

FB

FB Second
No FB

FB

903.25 921.42 861.44 1393.10 1606.55 1591.29 1407.53
(51.50) (53.92) (57.13) (49.38) (52.32) (51.05) (54.09)

Correct
1036.02 992.08 979.35 945.19 1510.73 1654.39 1770.67 1564.26
Rejections (48.83) (55.24) (54.17) (61.28) (49.61) (56.13) (51.29) (58.03)

For the 2-point condition, there was a tendency for hits to have faster RTs in the feedback
condition though this was not significant, F(1, 56) = 3.22, p = .08. There was no effect of test
order, F(1, 56) = .12, p = .73, and the interaction was also not significant, F(1, 56) = 2.63, p =
.11. For the 8-point condition, there was no effect of feedback or test order on RTs for hits, Fs <
1. The interaction between feedback and test was significant, F(1, 58) = 19.45, MSE = 60763.57,
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p < .001, ηp2 = .258, indicating that RTs for hits were faster in the no-feedback condition when
the test with feedback was completed first but that RTs were faster in the feedback condition
when the test including feedback was completed second. That is, RTs simply got faster across
the testing session.
Regarding RTs for correct rejections in the 2-point group, there was an effect of feedback
such that RTs were faster when feedback was present, F(1, 58) = 5.03, MSE = 8692.32, p = .03,
ηp2 = .082. Test order did not affect RTs, F(1, 56) = 1.72, p = .20, and the interaction was also
not significant, F(1, 56) = .08, p = .78. For the 8-point group, there was no main effect of
feedback on RTs for correct rejections, F(1, 58) = .77, p = .39. Additionally, the main effect of
test order was not significant, F(1, 58) = .86, p = .36. There was a significant interaction between
feedback and test order, F(1, 58) = 23.87, MSE = 38463.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .292, indicating that
RTs were faster on the test without feedback when that test was completed last and RTs were
faster on the test with feedback when that test was completed last.
Endnote
1

Reaction times were also analyzed by examining log-transformed median values of
hits and correct rejections. RTs were trimmed at the lower end for the 2 and 8-point groups at
300 and 500ms, respectively. Slower RTs were trimmed if they were 2.5 SDs above an
individual’s average RT. This trimming procedure removed only 3% of cases and the subsequent
analyses yielded the same results as those reported above.
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Discussion
To examine whether feedback introduces criterion noise into recognition memory
decisions, participants completed two study-test cycles in which accuracy feedback was present
on one test but not the other. Additionally, the type of recognition response was manipulated
such that participants made either “yes/no” decisions or gave confidence ratings. As predicted,
there was an overall negative effect of feedback such that discriminability was lower when
feedback was present. Discriminability was equal between the “yes/no” and confidence ratings
groups, which is somewhat problematic for ND-TSD as it predicts that memory should be better
when participants are making simple “yes/no” decisions. Additionally, the ordinal interaction
between feedback and response is difficult to explain using ND-TSD (Benjamin et al., 2009).
Feedback lowered discriminability more in the “yes/no” condition than in the confidence ratings
condition. ND-TSD predicts that feedback might interact with rating scale length, though it
predicts that feedback should be more harmful to recognition discriminability in the confidence
ratings condition. As noted earlier, Benjamin et al. (2013) found that longer rating scale length
was associated with lower recognition discriminability, which they interpreted as indicative of
criterion noise because making confidence decisions requires the use of multiple criteria.
However, unlike Benjamin et al. (2013), we manipulated rating scale length between subjects
rather than within-subjects. Hence, our failure to find that feedback lowers discriminability more
for rating scale decisions might reflect a couple of possible outcomes: this study lacked sufficient
statistical power to detect an effect of rating scale length or that the additive effects of different
sources of criterion noise were small or negligible. A detailed discussion of these possible
outcomes is deferred to the General Discussion section.
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Regarding the RT data, there was a very mixed bag of results. Participants in the 2-point
condition were slightly faster in the feedback condition which replicates Kantner and Lindsay
(Exp. 2; 2010) who also found slightly faster RTs in a feedback condition, albeit in the context of
making 6-point confidence ratings. However, RTs in the 8-point group were not impacted much
by the presence of feedback. Rather, the results indicated that they just got faster as the testing
session progressed. This also replicates Kantner and Lindsay (Exps. 3 & 4; 2010) who found in
two of their experiments that feedback had a null effect on RTs but that RTs generally got faster
across testing blocks. The RT data also speak against a simple speed-accuracy tradeoff in regards
to why feedback lowers discriminability. For the 2-point group, RTs were only significantly
faster for correct rejections when feedback was present, whereas we might expect a speedaccuracy tradeoff to affect both types of correct decisions. Additionally, discriminability was
lowered by the feedback in the 8-point condition, though not to the same degree as in the 2-point
condition. Regardless, feedback lowered discriminability in 8-point condition but there were no
significant RT differences between feedback and no feedback conditions.
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Experiment 2
As mentioned earlier, Verde and Rotello (2007) found numerically worse discriminability
using a strength manipulation at encoding and by presenting test items in blocks according to
their strength. Hicks and Starns (2014) found a significant negative effect of feedback on
discriminability using this procedure and also found that the presence of color cues denoting
memory strength lowered discriminability. Thus, the aim of this experiment was to assess how
feedback and color cues indicative of memory strength (i.e. strong or weak) would affect
recognition discriminability when test items are presented randomly rather than in blocks.
Because a random test condition requires frequent criterion shifts, I hypothesized that this test
format would create more criterion noise than a blocked test and hence would allow for the
potentially negative effects of feedback and color cues to be more readily observable. Both
feedback and color cues were predicted to lower discriminability and these two variables were
predicted to have additive negative effects.
Participants
One hundred and twenty-three undergraduate Psychology students from Louisiana State
University participated in this experiment to fulfill a partial course requirement or for extra
credit.
Materials
Four hundred unique words with the same properties as the stimuli used in Experiment 1
were randomly selected from the MCR psycholinguistic database. Four programs were created
using E-Prime software and 100 words were randomly assigned as stimuli for each of the four
programs.
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Design
The design was a 2 (feedback: present or absent) × 2 (strength: strong or weak targets) ×
2 (color marking: present or absent) × 2 (test order: feedback on first or second test) mixedfactorial, with feedback and strength manipulated within-subjects and color marking at test and
test order manipulated between-subjects.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually or in pairs for each experimental session and
completed two study-test cycles. Participants were told they would study a list of words for a
later memory test and that some words would be presented multiple times. For the encoding
procedure, the program randomly selected 40 words from the pool of 100 items, half of which
were presented four times (strong targets) and half of which were presented only once (weak
targets). Ten filler items were presented at the beginning and end of each encoding to act as
primacy and recency buffers. Thus, the encoding phase consisted of 100 presentations which
were randomized anew for each participant. Words were presented individually for a 700 ms
immediately followed by a blank 100ms ISI. The remaining 40 words served as lures on the test,
half of which were assigned to the strong color cue while the remaining 20 were assigned to the
weak color cue. These lure stimulus assignments were made by the software even when the color
cue was not provided. This aspect of the procedure is identical that used by Hicks & Starns
(2014).
After the encoding phase, participants were immediately given test instructions informing
them they would take a test composed of studied and non-studied words. For participants in the
marked condition, they were informed that test items studied four times would be presented in
red font color, words studied once would be presented in green, and that new test items will
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appear half in red and half green. For participants in the unmarked condition, all test items were
presented in black. Participants made an “old” or “new” decision for each test item by pressing
the “/” and “z” keys, respectively. In both conditions, test items were randomly presented. For
the programs that included feedback, participants were additionally informed that feedback will
appear on the test. Specifically, they were told that they would see the message
“***ERROR***” when they made an incorrect decision. This feedback screen lasted for 1200
ms. The order in which participants received feedback at test was counterbalanced across
participants.
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Results
Nineteen participants were excluded from the analyses because they were at or below
chance performance in one or both of the recognition tests. Thus, a final sample size of 104
participants was used in the analyses.
Discriminability
Group recognition data are presented below in Table 4. For each recognition test, HR,
FAR, and d’ was calculated separately for strong and weak items.

Table 4. Group recognition data from Experiment 2 with standard error in parentheses.

Unmarked
No Feedback

Marked

Feedback

No Feedback

Feedback

Weak

Strong

Weak

Strong

Weak

Strong

Weak

Strong

HR

.67
(.02)

.88
(.02)

.67
(.02)

.86
(.01)

.65
(.02)

.87
(.01)

.67
(.02)

.85
(.01)

FAR

.28
(.02)

.27
(.02)

.26
(.02)

.31
(.02)

.28
(.02)

.26
(.02)

.32
(.02)

.27
(.02)

d’

1.17
(.09)

2.04
(.09)

1.17
(.02)

1.72
(.10)

1.10
(.06)

1.94
(.08)

1.01
(.08)

1.79
(.09)

Discriminability was examined by analyzing d’ with a 2 (feedback) × 2 (color marking) ×
2 (strength) × 2 (test order) mixed-factorial ANOVA. A significant main effect of strength
indicated that memory was better for strong than weak items, F(1, 102) = 186.60, MSE = .313, p
< .001, ηp2 = .651. Critically, there was a main effect of feedback, F(1, 102) = 8.00, MSE = .258,
p = .006, ηp2 = .074, whereby discriminability was lower when feedback was present. The main
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effects of test order, F(1, 102) = 2.28, p = .13, and color marking, F(1, 102) = .94, p = .33, were
not significant. There was no significant interaction between strength and test order, F(1, 102) =
.60, p = .44, or between strength and color marking, F(1, 102) = .75, p = .39. However, the there
was a significant three-way interaction between these variables, F(1, 102) = 7.39, MSE = .313, p
= .008, ηp2 = .069. When feedback was first, memory for strong items was higher in the
unmarked (M = 1.99, SE = .10) relative to the marked condition (M = 1.66, SE = .11). However,
when feedback was second, memory for strong items was higher in the marked (M = 2.04, SE =
.10) versus the unmarked condition (M = 1.76, SE = .10).
Feedback did not significantly interact with test order, F(1, 102) = 3.74, p = .056, though
there was a trend for feedback to lower discriminability more when the test including feedback
was completed after the test with no feedback. Feedback also did not interact with color marking,
F(1, 102) = .18, p = .68. However, there was an unexpected interaction between feedback and
strength, F(1, 102) = 4.00, MSE = .212, p = .049, ηp2 = .038. Post-hoc tests revealed that
feedback significantly lowered discriminability for strong items, t(103) = 3.50, p = .001, Cohen’s
d = .34, but not for weak items, t(103) = .70, p = .49, Cohen’s d = .07 (Figure 4). The interaction
between test order and color marking was also not significant, F(1, 102) = 3.92, p = .051,
however discriminability was nominally higher in the marked (M = 1.58, SE = .07) versus the
unmarked (M = 1.51, SE = .08) condition when the test with feedback was completed second but
was lower in marked (M = 1.32, SE = .08) versus the unmarked (M = 1.54, SE = .08) condition
when the test including feedback was completed first. There was no three-way interaction
between feedback, strength, and test order, F(1, 102) = 2.67, p = .11. Additionally, the three-way
interaction between feedback, strength, and color marking was also not significant, F(1, 102) =
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2.37, p = .13. Lastly, the four-way interaction between all variables was not significant, F(1, 102)
< .001, p = .99.
Reaction Times
The group RT data is displayed below in Table 5.

Table 5. Average median RTs from Experiment 2 with standard error in parentheses.
Unmarked
FB First
No FB

FB

Marked

FB Second
No FB

FB

FB First

FB Second

No FB

FB

No FB

FB

Hits
Strong

745.96 812.85 730.18 801.18
(26.17) (31.91) (26.69) (32.54)

840.02
(27.24)

954.75
(33.21)

839.86
(24.78)

886.88
(30.21)

Weak

836.79 896.71 798.20 879.92
(37.80) (35.51) (38.55) (36.22)

897.58
(39.34)

1031.25 1022.47
(36.97) (35.79)

969.31
(33.63)

Correct
Rejections
Strong

903.00 982.83 907.70 943.34 1045.75 1136.10 1055.81 1010.52
(33.86) (32.24) (34.53) (32.88) (35.24) (33.56) (32.06) (30.53)

Weak

927.94 946.96 899.94 943.42
(29.50) (30.63) (30.09) (31.24)

949.00
(30.71)

1081.85 1020.48 1036.62
(31.88) (27.93) (29.01)

Median RTs for hits and correct rejections were separately analyzed for each strength
condition with a 2 (color marking) × 2 (feedback) × 2 (test order) mixed-factorial ANOVA. RTs
faster than 300ms or slower than 2000ms were trimmed prior to analysis1.
Regarding hits for strong items, there was a main effect of feedback such that RTs were
faster when feedback was absent, F(1, 102) = 32.48, MSE = 8940.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .245.
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Additionally, a main effect of color making revealed that RTs were faster in the unmarked
condition, F(1, 102) = 17.03, MSE = 35335.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .146. The main effect of test order
was not significant, F(1, 102) = .83, p = .36. Lastly, none of the interactions was significant:
feedback × color marking, F(1, 102) = .21, p = .65; feedback × test order, F(1, 102) = 1.46, p =
.23; marking × test order, F(1, 102) = .15, p = .70; feedback × marking × test order, F(1, 102) =
1.87, p = .18.
For weak items, there was a main effect of feedback on hit RTs, indicating that RTs were
faster when feedback was absent, F(1, 102) = 9.28, MSE = 17199.37, p = .003, ηp2 = .085. A
main effect of marking was obtained, whereby RTs were faster in the unmarked condition, F(1,
102) = 15.89, MSE = 52735.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .137. There was no main effect of test order, F(1,
102) = .004, p = .95. However, test order did interact with feedback, F(1, 102) = 5.12, MSE =
17199.37, p = .026, ηp2 = .049. When the test with feedback was completed first, RTs were faster
on the test without feedback but when the test with feedback was completed last there was no
difference between feedback and no feedback RTs. Additionally, the three way interaction
between feedback, marking, and test order was significant, F(1, 102) = 8.18, MSE = 17199.37, p
= .005, ηp2 = .076, whereby in the unmarked condition RTs were always faster when feedback
was absent but in the marked condition RTs were faster on whichever test (with feedback or
without feedback) was completed last. There was no significant interaction between feedback
and marking, F(1, 102) = .70, p = .40, or between marking and test order, F(1, 102) = .86, p =
.36.
Moving on to RTs for correct rejections of strong items, there was a main effect of
feedback, F(1, 102) = 6.23, MSE = 13376.37, p = .014, ηp2 = .059, such that RTs were faster on
the tests without feedback. There was a significant main effect of marking, F(1, 102) = 19.45,
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MSE = 43460.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .163, indicating that RTs were faster in the unmarked condition.
A significant feedback by test order interaction, F(1, 102) = 6.23, MSE = 13376.37, p = .014, ηp2
= .059, revealed that RTs were faster on the test without feedback when it was completed second
and that there was no difference in feedback and no feedback RTs when the test with feedback
was completed second. There was no significant interaction between feedback and marking, F(1,
102) = 1.20, p = .28, or between marking and test order, F(1, 102) = .49, p = .49. The three way
interaction was not significant, F(1, 102) = 2.02, p = .16.
For the RTs of correct rejections of weak items, there was a main effect of feedback, F(1,
102) = 15.09, MSE = 9588.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .131, indicating that RTs were slower when
feedback was present. A main effect of color marking revealed that RTs were slower in the
marked condition, F(1, 102) = 19.45, MSE = 37473.99, p = .001, ηp2 = .106. There was no effect
of test order, F(1, 102) = .002, p = .96. Feedback did not interact with test order, F(1, 102) =
2.87, p = .09, nor did it interact with marking, F(1, 102) = 2.52, p = .12. However, the three-way
interaction between these variables was significant, F(1, 102) = 6.72, MSE = 9588.08, p = .011,
ηp2 = .063, indicating that RTs in the unmarked group did not vary by test order or feedback but
in the marked condition RTs were faster when feedback was absent but only when the test
including feedback was completed first. Lastly, the interaction between color marking and test
order was not significant, F(1, 102) = .29, p = .59.
Endnote
1

Reaction times were also analyzed by examining log-transformed median values of
hits and correct rejections. RTs were trimmed if they were faster than 300ms or 2.5 SDs above a
person’s mean RT. This trimming procedure removed only 3% trials. Subsequent analyses
resulted in similar results to those above with the exception that for correct rejections, there is no
main effect of feedback for strong or weak items.
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Discussion
In this experiment, participants completed two recognition tests in which feedback at test
was either present or absent. Additionally, we manipulated the memory strength of items and the
presence of color cues at test indicating memory strength (strong or weak). Overall, feedback
was found to lower discriminability as predicted by ND-TSD (Benjamin et al., 2009). In
particular, the presence of feedback significantly lowered discriminability for strong items
whereas discriminability for weak items was relatively unaffected. These results provide mixed
support for ND-TSD (Benjamin et al., 2009) as the theory would predict that feedback should
lower discriminability via introducing criterion noise into the recognition decision. However, it is
unclear why feedback for strong items would produce more criterion noise than feedback for
weak items. Additionally, there was no effect of color cues at test, which is consistent with the
ND-TSD prediction that giving people a cue to better recognize differences in target distributions
should reduce criterion noise. The overall result suggests that different, multiple sources of
criterion noise may not have additive effects, though there was a trend for discriminability to be
lower in the marked condition relative to the unmarked condition when the test with feedback
was completed first. However, the nature of this marginally significant interaction was disordinal
in that participants actually had slightly higher discriminability in the marked condition when the
test including feedback was completed after the test with no feedback. If color cues are a source
of criterion noise, then they should be an impediment to discriminability regardless of the test
order. One potential explanation here is simply that there were practice effects resulting from
using the color cues on the first test. A more elaborate discussion of these findings is reserved for
the next section.
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Regarding RTs, both feedback and marking generally led to longer RTs, suggesting that
participants were in fact trying to use the color marking and incorporating the feedback.
Additionally, participant RTs generally got faster across the testing session, which likely reflects
a practice effect. Taken together, the RT data suggest that the deleterious impact of feedback is
not simply a speed-accuracy trade off. If this were the case we would have expected feedback to
speed responses only for strong items since feedback only lowered discriminability for strong
items, but the results show that feedback speeded responses regardless of strength.
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General Discussion
The primary goal of this study was to test the hypothesis that feedback lowers recognition
discriminability by means of introducing criterion noise into the decision process. According to
ND-TSD (Benjamin et al., 2009) criterion variance is not fixed (i.e. zero) as traditionally
assumed by SDT (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) but instead can
randomly vary on each trial. The consequence of this criterion variability is that a strain on
memory (i.e., discriminability) is experienced when having to maintain a criterion (e.g. Benjamin
et al., 2013) or when attempting to update that criterion. Thus, two general predictions can be
derived from ND-TSD: any test manipulation that encourages a person to update or adjust their
criterion or any circumstance in which a person is required to hold multiple criteria will lower
recognition discriminability. Corrective feedback given on recognition tests is meant to help
improve performance by allowing participants to make favorable criterion adjustments, but this
constant updating of criteria might actually introduce criterion noise and thus lower
discriminability.
To investigate the possibility that feedback produces a real and deleterious effect on
recognition discriminability, feedback was manipulated within-subjects in two experiments in
which we also manipulated rating scale length (Experiment 1) and memory strength and color
cues at test indicating strength (Experiment 2). There are four primary results from these
experiments which are summarized here. First, in both experiments participants’ overall
discriminability was lower when feedback was present rather than absent at test. Second,
feedback in Experiment 1 produced a larger negative effect when participants made simple
“yes/no” decisions to test items as opposed when they made confidence ratings. Third, feedback
in Experiment 2 produced lower discriminability for strong items but exerted only a negligible

42

effect on weak items. Fourth, the presence of color cues in Experiment 2 indicative of memory
strength had no effect on discriminability.
Regarding the first point, this overall negative effect of feedback replicates the work of
Hicks and Starns (2014) who found feedback lowered discriminability in various blocked test
conditions when target strength was manipulated. The present results also extended this negative
effect of feedback to a random test condition in this same strength-based paradigm (cf.
Experiment 2). In addition, feedback in Experiment 1 generally lowered discriminability
regardless of response type, although this effect was smaller in the context of confidence ratings.
The negative influence of feedback is also generally consistent with the effect size estimates
discussed earlier in Table 1. Thus, no hint of a positive influence of feedback was found
anywhere in the various conditions of these experiments. When feedback did exert a significant
influence, it was a negative one.
Regarding the second point, although the ordinal interaction between feedback and rating
scale length was not predicted a priori, it is worth speculating about this finding as it has
implications for ND-TSD. Specifically, this theory predicts that more criterion noise should be
created as the length of the response rating scale increases (Benjamin et al., 2009; 2013). There
are several reasons why we might have failed to find this effect of rating scale length. One
possibility is that because of our between-subjects manipulation of rating scale length, we simply
lacked statistical power to detect this effect. However, when comparing the 2-point versus the 8point conditions collapsed across feedback conditions, discriminability was slightly better for the
rating scale condition, rather than worse. Experiment 1’s outcome therefore replicates Lindsay
and Kantner (Exp. 3, 2011) as well as Koen and Yonelinas (2011) who found no differences in
discriminability when comparing “yes/no” versus confidence rating decisions. Benjamin et al.
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(2013) found a small difference between these types of recognition decisions, though they are
also the only study to manipulate response type within-subjects. So it is possible that the
influence of response type is so small that it is best studied in a within-subjects context.
Alternatively it could be that there is only a negligible amount criterion noise introduced into
recognition decisions when participants make confidence ratings (Kellen et al., 2012).
Regardless of the interaction produced in Experiment 1, those results suggest that the presence of
feedback had much more influence on discriminability than did the type of response context.
Further work should focus on replicating the influence of rating scales versus “yes/no” decisions.
Another possible interpretation for feedback exhibiting a larger negative effect in the 2point versus the 8-point rating decision is that the range in which criterion can vary is smaller in
the 8-point condition. In the 8-point rating condition, participants are assumed to set a criterion
for each confidence boundary. One consequence of this might be that the criterion variance for
any particular level of confidence is artificially restricted in that even when a criterion is variable
it does not cross the confidence boundary (i.e. criterion) immediately above or below it. Put
another way, even when criterion variance is present for a given confidence level, say dividing a
“5” from a “6”, the criterion for that level can only vary within the boundaries of the other
confidence levels, as opposed to crossing into the boundary between a “4” and “5” or between a
“6” and “7”. A related idea comes from Mueller and Weidemann (2008) who suggest that for
each confidence level, criteria can be represented as overlapping normal distributions on an axis
of perceptual evidence (e.g. memory strength). For a given amount of evidence, there is a high
probability that the criterion corresponding to that particular level of confidence will be selected,
though occasionally a criterion is sampled from one of the overlapping criterion distributions.
Conversely, when a participant makes “yes/no” decisions, they use only a single criterion. In this
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case, because there are no other levels of confidence, the criterion is free to vary across a larger
range of memory strength because it never encroaches upon any other decision boundary.
Admittedly, this explanation is post-hoc and, in its present state, ND-TSD allows for criterion
variability even across confidence boundaries, in fact predicting more noise in this response
context (Benjamin et al., 2009). Concerning the effect of color cues indicative of the memory
strength of test items in Experiment 2, the presence of these cues did not affect discriminability.
Hicks and Starns (2014) found that these types of test cues lowered discriminability in their
strength-blocked tests of varying sizes. In contrast, color cues did not have a significant effect on
discriminability here. This finding replicates Stretch and Wixted (Exp. 3, 1998), though it should
be noted that in their study and in the present work discriminability was numerically larger in the
unmarked conditions, in the direction of color marking producing a negative effect. Thus, the
effect size for this factor is small, as indicated by Hicks and Starns. They found a significant
effect in statistical comparisons comprised of over 200 participants in each of their first two
experiments.
Prior to conducting this study, I collected pilot data in an experiment identical to
Experiment 2, except that feedback was manipulated between-subjects and color cues were
manipulated within-subjects (Appendix A). In this pilot study, the presence of color cues
significantly lowered discriminability whereas there was only a trend for feedback to harm
discriminability. The contrast between the present work and this pilot data illustrates the point
that the effects of both feedback and marking are small and often hard to detect depending on the
type of experimental manipulation used. Again, another reason for the finding that feedback but
not color cues harm discriminability could be that different sources of criterion noise do not have
an additive effect. If a random test condition that requires essentially trial-by-trial updating of a
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response criterion creates more criterion noise than color cues, then the present study may be
limited in its ability to detect a significant source of criterion noise above and beyond that
created by a random test condition. However, in the present study there is no manipulation of test
composition. Thus a direct comparison of discriminability in an unmarked condition between a
random and blocked test cannot be made here.
It is important to note that according to ND-TSD (Benjamin et al., 2009), when color
cues denoting memory strength are provided at test, the amount of criterion noise should actually
be diminished. Specifically, Benjamin et al. (2009) predicted that when participants can treat
multiple classes of test items (e.g. weak and strong) differently, criterion variance should be
reduced. Again, the purpose of presenting the color cues at test is to get participants to treat
strong and weak test items differently. Thus, the results here do not support one of the explicit
predictions of ND-TSD. It remains to be seen whether a cleaner manipulation of making people
aware of strength differences might produce results in line with the ND-TSD prediction. For
example, one could rely on a more extreme manipulation of strength by adding repetitions to the
strong items, or perhaps with a more traditional shallow/deep manipulation based on the levels of
processing framework (Craik & Lockhart, 1972).
Unexpectedly, the results from Experiment 2 showed that feedback exerted a negative
influence on the discriminability of strong but not weak items. In the color marked condition,
discriminability for weak items was slightly lower in the feedback condition. However, in the
unmarked condition, discriminability for weak items was identical in both feedback conditions. It
is rather unclear why feedback would differentially affect strong but not weak items. One
possibility is that feedback may only have a beneficial, or at least benign, effect on
discriminability when the recognition decision is particularly difficult to make. That is, when a
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person is required to make a more fine-grained decision (e.g. discriminating a weak target from a
lure), feedback may not exert a negative effect because the decision is already moderately noisy.
Conversely, there may be a smaller amount of pre-existing noise for easier recognition decisions
(e.g. discriminating a strong target from a lure). Thus, feedback might exert an adverse effect
only on strong items because it introduces criterion noise into a decision that typically has a low
amount of noise. This explanation is consistent with the previously suggested idea that there may
be an upper limit to the amount of noise (criterion noise or stimulus noise) that can impact
recognition decisions.
Related Accounts of Criterion Variability
Although the idea and significance of criterion variability is a relatively recent matter of
debate for memory researchers, the idea of criterion variance has longstanding roots in the
psychophysical literature (e.g. Tanner, 1961). For example, Schoeffler (1965) developed an
intricate model of learning in the context of SDT in which feedback is explicitly considered as a
factor of interest. According to Schoeffler (1965), when feedback is present at test, subject’s
knowledge of their performance, particularly when they make an error, will lead them to adjust
their criterion in order to more appropriately respond on the next trial. However, in the absence
of feedback, subjects do not adjust their criterion (i.e. criterion variance is zero) and the results of
his modeling predicts that discriminability should be better when no feedback is present. One
subtle contrast here with ND-TSD (Benjamin et al., 2009) is that ND-TSD posits that criterion
noise exists even without feedback, as simply using and maintaining a criterion introduces noise.
Schoeffler’s notion that participants use feedback to adjust their criterion was echoed by Kac
(1969) who proposed that people will only adjust their criterion in response to error feedback.
That is, when a person is made aware that they made a correct decision, they have no motivation
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to adopt a more liberal or conservative criterion However, when informed of an incorrect
decision, people will adjust slightly in the appropriate direction as to minimize the risk of making
that error again (i.e. liberal shift for a miss and a conservative shift for a false alarm). However,
this assumes that observers equally value errors of omission and commission which may not
always be the case (e.g. payoff manipulations).
Another theory of criterion variability comes from Mueller and Weidemann (2008) who
propose a decision noise model (DNM) extension of SDT. The authors make the distinction
between “stimulus noise” and “decision noise”, with the latter reflecting an analogous concept to
criterion noise. According to the DNM, decision noise is essentially a mismapping between an
internal state (e.g. familiarity) and an external response (e.g. confidence rating). Similar to NDTSD, the DNM asserts that on a particular test trial, a criterion value is selected from a
distribution of criteria. Additionally, both of these theories predict that recognition
discriminability should be better when making “yes/no” decisions versus confidence ratings,
although the mechanisms by which that happen are different. ND-TSD predicts that
discriminability is lower for rating scale confidence decisions because each level of confidence
must be maintained which places a burden on the observer to remember where each criterion
maps onto varying levels of memory strength (Benjamin et al., 2009). Alternatively, DNM posits
that discriminability is worse for confidence ratings because some of the criterion distributions
overlap at any given point of memory strength. That is, for a given familiarity value, an observer
may sample from multiple overlapping criterion distributions (i.e. confidence levels) which leads
to suboptimal performance (Mueller & Weidemann, 2008).
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Summary and Future Directions
Taken together, the results from both experiments provide an empirical point of departure
from the extant work on feedback in recognition (Kantner & Lindsay, 2010) in that the data from
this study indicate that feedback has a real, albeit small, deleterious impact on discriminability.
The primary basis for re-examining this abundance of null results stemmed from predictions
based on ND-TSD (Benjamin et al., 2009) which asserts that manipulations designed to get
people to adjust their criterion may create criterion noise which subsequently leads to lower
discriminability. Although considering feedback as a source of criterion noise is consistent with
the spirit of ND-TSD theory, feedback was not a factor considered by Benjamin and colleagues
as a potential source of noise. Moreover, other results from this study suggest that embracing
ND-TSD theory in its current state would be premature. For instance, in the first experiment the
length of the rating scale had no effect on discriminability. One potential way to explore this idea
would be to manipulate both feedback and rating scale length within-subjects. This should enable
an effect of rating scale length to emerge, if it exists, and also to observe if an ordinal interaction
exists between feedback and rating scale length.
Also, even though color marking in Experiment 2 did not significantly harm recognition
discriminability, it also did not help performance as predicted by ND-TSD theory. Assuming that
color marking should produce a negative influence, contrary to the ND-TSD predictions but
consistent with prior work by Hicks and Starns (2014), in the second experiment there was no
additive negative effect of feedback and color cues, again indicating that different sources of
criterion noise may not accumulate. However, the ability to observe this may again be limited by
the experimental design. In all cases, participants completed a random test which may produce so
much criterion variance on its own that layering color cues on top of that is essentially a drop in
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the bucket. This issue could be addressed by also including a condition where participants
completed a blocked test as in Hicks and Starns (2014). Additionally, ND-TSD does not give an
account of why there might be more criterion noise for strong versus weak items.
Future examinations of feedback in recognition might also do well to follow the lead of
Kellen et al. (2012) who examined criterion noise in a ranking task which the authors assumed to
be criterion free. Although the results from the present study provide evidence that feedback has
a negative impact on recognition discriminability with criterion variance as a proposed
mechanism, whether or not that decrement reflects criterion noise per se is, admittedly, not an
entirely resolved issue. Although the current work was motivated by ND-TSD, the primary goal
here was to examine whether feedback has a genuine, adverse effect on recognition
discriminability and not necessarily to champion ND-TSD. If it is truly criterion noise that is
causing an adverse effect of discriminability, that decrement should not exist in a task where
participants do not typically exhibit bias such as a two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) task. If
feedback lowered discriminability on a 2AFC task, those results would be very problematic for
ND-TSD or for any theory that might propose criterion noise as a source of the negative
influence of feedback. Alternatively, if feedback does not affect performance in a 2AFC task that
would provide some indirect evidence that the locus of the decrement is in fact the criterion.
Conclusions
In closing, the results from this study provide evidence that recognition discriminability
can be negatively affected in the presence of feedback. Previously, feedback has been regarded
as a potential source of advantageous information that should lead to better discriminability.
Some support was found for ND-TSD which predicts that feedback is a source of criterion noise.
Additionally, no evidence was found which would suggest that independent sources of criterion
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noise can have additive effects. Models of memory will need to be able to account for the
negative effect of feedback at test and current theories which explicitly state that feedback should
help recognition discriminability (e.g. Turner et al., 2011) will need to consider the results from
this study in future work.
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Appendix A: Pilot Experiment Data
Pilot experiment data wherein color cues were manipulated within-subjects and feedback
between subjects on a random test. Standard error of the mean in parentheses.
Unmarked
No Feedback

Marked
Feedback

No Feedback

Feedback

Weak

Strong

Weak

Strong

Weak

Strong

Weak

Strong

HR

.69
(.01)

.91
(.01)

.69
(.02)

.89
(.01)

.67
(.02)

.86
(.02)

.66
(.02)

.85
(.02)

FAR

.30
(.02)

.28
(.02)

.31
(.02)

.31
(.02)

.31
(.02)

.33
(.02)

.33
(.02)

.34
(.02)

d’

1.15
(.09)

2.13
(.09)

1.14
(.09)

1.91
(.11)

1.08
(.09)

1.72
(.10)

.91
(.07)

1.61
(.11)
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